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The concept  of conditional  welfare  dominance  can be used to
determine  which  excise  taxes  are  preferable,  both  for equity  and
administrative  feasiblity. Applied  to C6te d'Ivoire, the tech-
nique shows that the most effective  excise  taxes would  be on
electricity  and telephone  services.
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There is a compelling fiscal rationale for encour-  concept of marginal conditional welfare domi-
aging greater reliance on taxing the consumption  nance.  A commodity tax dominates others on
of electricity and telephone (ET) services.  social welfare grounds when a marginal shift in
the balance of commodity taxation toward that
ET taxes are easy to administer. Enforce-  particular comnodity enhances social welfare.
ment and collection of the tax is relatively
inexpensive, since the tax can be added to com-  Using household budget data, such domi-
rnercial charges, and the services quickly turned  nance can be established statistically and shown
off for nonpayment.  It is not difficult to distin-  graphically without resort to normative consid-
guish in most cases between business and  erations.  T'is  approach suggeats that ET
personal use of these services. ET taxes avoid  services may be an underexploited tax base in
the problems of smuggling and evasion com-  many developing countries.
monly associated with taxing the production or
use of commodities that can be imported.  ET taxes may also meet the test of relatively
high efficiency if they can be implemented
On equity grounds, in COte  d'lvoire at least,  thomugh  a two-part pricing schedule that charges
ET taxes are clearly the most desirable excise  a flat fee for access to service and an additional
taxes.  Ranking alternative commodity taxes  escalating fee for marginal use.
with high income elasticity, telephone services
clearly dominate - and electricity consumption  This paper is a product of the Public Eco-
nearly dominates - the taxation of alcoholic  nomics Division, Country Economics Depart-
beverages and public transportation.  ment.  Copies are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
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References  ...........  37Governments  in  developing  countries  are  continuously  searching  for
new  and  improved tax bases.  Existing methods of taxation in these
countries  frequently  fall  short of meeting acceptable criteria of
efficiency,  equity  and administrative  ease.  This paper  argues  that there
is  a compelling  fiscal  rationale  for  encouraging  greater  reliance  on taxing
the consumption of electrical and telephone (ET) services.  Greater
emphasis on this selective commodity tax base would contribute  to the
achievement  of taxpayer equity and would be administratively  easy to
impose. In  addition,  as  argued  later  on,  the  efficiency  characteristics  of
this  form of taxation  may also add to the attractiveness  of the  ET base.
These  advantages  are  described  below.
This  paper  makes  further  use  of the  notion  of  marginal  conditional
welfare  dominance  in exploring  the equity  implications  of adopting  the  ET
tax  base in the Cote d'Ivoire. In an earlier  set of papers  Yitzhaki  and
Olkin (1987)  and  Yitzhaki  and Slemrod  (1987)  have developed  this  concept
and applied it to an  investigation of the redistributive impact of
commodity  taxation  in Israel.  In this  paper,  we develop  an extension  of
this methodology  by introducing  dead-weight  loss considerations  into the
analysis. We also  consider  some  other  excise  tax  bases  besides  electricity
and  telephones.
If a commodity  tax dominates  others  on welfare  grounds  it means
that,  for  a  wide class  of secial  welfare  functions,  social  welfare  will  be
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enhanced  by a marginal  shift  in the  balance  of commodity  taxation  towards
that particular commodity.  There is nothing in the methodology that
guarantees  a complete  ranking  of alternative  commodity  tax structures  can
be obtained  but, in the countries  examined  so far, a partial  ranking  is
feasible and serves to identify some tax bases that are promising  on
distributional grounds.  In the C6te  d'Ivoire, and possibly other
developing  countries  as  well,  the  ET  base is  one  of these.
The remainder  of this  paper  is organized  as follows. The overall
merits  of adopting  an ET ttz  are discussed  in the section  below.  After
that  the  concept  of  marginal  conditional  welfare  dominanc  'teria  is  more
fully  explained,  and its application  leads  to utilizing  u  -1-known  tool
for  analyzing  tax  incidence,  the  concentration  curve. (See  Pfahler,  (1987)
and the literature  cited  there). The application  of this approach  to the
ranking  oL alternative  taxes  in the  C6te d'Ivoire  is  discussed  in  the  next
section.  The final  part of the paper summarizes  the  main arguments  and
examines  some  of the  ways in  which  they  may  be extended  in future  work.
A.  The  General  Case  for  an ET  Tax
Although commonly deployed in developing  countries, commodity
taxes are felt to have limited appeal and to be tolerated  only until
superior  methods  of  taxation, usually  related  to  incomes, can be
cultivated.  - Objections  to commodity  taxes  come from several  directions.
Broad-based  commodity  taxes  on consumption  such  as a  value-added  tax  (VAT),
are  viewed  as efficient  revenue  instruments  but are  frequently  objected  to
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on distribution  grounds,  i.e. "making  the  poor even  poorer".  Efforts  to
narrow  the  VAT base and  make it more distributionally  acceptable  normally
give rise to problems of administrative  complexity  and, to the extent
exemptions  are  used to grant  relief,  create  numerous  economic  distortions
that detract from economic efficiency.  Moreover, in many developing
countries  more  narrowly  based  commodity  taxes  are  inappropriately  levied  on
production  rather  than consumption.3! Production  taxes  may be easier  to
collect but  they also lead to tax cascading which seriously distorts
economic  behavior  and  generates  a haphazard  pattern  of tax  incidence.
In a  number  of developing  countries  the  challenge  facing  commodity
taxation  is to get taxes  off of production  and onto consumption  that is
linked  to ability  to pay and to do so in a way that is administratively
feasible. The ET tax  base offers  one response  to this  challenge. First,
as shown  below,  a wide range  of social  welfare  functions  would  approve  of
its adoption  in the C6te d'Ivoire  for income  distribution  reasons  and  we
suspect  that  the  same  result  would  hold in  many  other  developing  countries.
Secondly,  it is relatively  easy to distinguish  business  from residential
use of electricity and  telephones; the only major difficulty occurs
whenever  households  operate  a  business  from  out of their  home.  Mainly  for
this reason  Cnossen (1978)  argues  that it is better  to tax all usage of
telephones. Thirdly,  enforcement  and collection  of the  tax is relatively
inexpensive  since  the  tax  can  be easily  added  on to commercial  charges  and
services  can be quickly  turned  off in the  case  of noncompliance. Fourth,
because  it applies  to a nontradeable  service,  the ET tax  does not  have to
grapple  with the issue  of taxing  imports  and domestic  production  in a fair
4assll#4/Welfare  Dominance  & the  Design  of  Excise  Taxation  in  the  Coto  D'Ivoire/WThirsk:ab/5/18/88and  consistent  manner.  Smuggling  and  evasion,  common  problems  with excise
taxes  on commodities,  will  not emerge  under  an  ET tax.
Finally,  although  there  is  much less  certainty  on this  score,  the
ET  tax may be  a  relatively efficient tax instrument  because it can
effectively burden  infra-marginal  units of consumption.  Significant
installation  or hook-up  charges  may  be able  to capture  a sizeable  fraction
of the  consumers'  surplus  from  using  these  services  and allow  lower  rates
to be charged  for marginal  usage  witn  correspondingly  smaller  distortions
of consumer  choice. Charging  a fee  for  access  to the service  effectively
introduces  an element  of  poll  taxation  into  the  tax  system  and  this  feature
of the  tax  may render  it  a relatively  efficient  instrument  of taxation.
Of all of the  merits  add-:essed  in support  of the  ET tax  base,  the
one that is examiined  in greater  detail  below is the claim  made for its
distributive  superiority.  As will  be seen,  the  ET tax  base  dominates  other
commodity  tax  bases  on income  distribution  grounds  tn the  C6te  d'Ivoire.
B.  The  Concept  of  Welfare  Do".inance
As explained  more  fu.ly  in  Yitzhaki  and  Slemrod  (1987),  the  notion
of  marginal  conditional  welfare  dominance  (hereafter  welfare  dominance)  has
its  origins  in the  theory  of finance. In the  fin  nce  literature  asset  A is
said to stochastically  dominate  asset B in the investor's  portfolio  if,
given the composition  of other assets  in the ptrtfolio,  the investor's
expected  utility  is always  enhanced  whenever  a small  amount  of asset  A is
substituted  for asset  B.  The only restriction  imposed  on the investor's
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utility  function  is that  the  marginal  utility  of income  be a  non-'  creasing
function  of income.
In a certain  world  ..  . commodity  taxation  the  analogous  question
is  whether  substituting  one  coituodity  tax for  another in  a revenue-neutral
fashion  will improve  social  welfare. Frequently  the  answer  to this  type  of
question  has depended  on the exact  shape  of the social  welfare  function.
In the optimum  tax literature,  for instance,  the analysis  of desirable
commodity  tax structures  often  has been bedevilled  by sensitivity  to the
exact  specification  of the  social  welfare  function.
The concept  of welfare  dominance  does not suffer  from the same
defect. It adopts  a Utilitarian  formulation  of the  social  welfare  function
which is distributively  neutral since each household or income class
receives  the  same  ethical  weight. The  only  assumption  required  is  that  the
marginal  utility  of income  be a non-increasing  function  of  real income. If
a particular  tax substitution  is shown  to be welfare  dominant  under  this
assumption it will be  true a fortiori for all other social welfare
functions which  exhibit some greater degree of aversion to  income
inequality.
Formally, the argument can be constructed  along the following
lines  with  the  aid  of the  notation  below:
W  - level  of social  welfare
vh  - level  of  utility  attained  by the  h'th  household,
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where
vh _  (P 1, ..  Pn,  Yh) is  the  indirect  utility  function
Yh  - money  income  received  by the  n'th  household
xh-  amount  of the  J'th  commodity  consumed  by  the  h'th  household
Pj - consumer  price  for  the  jth  commodity
h Xi - total  consumption  of commodity  j  (Xi  - Zh  xj
For  a distribution  of H households  the  Utilitarian  social  welfare
function  can  be expressed  as:
(1)  W _ -_1 Vh  (P 1 P2 . Pn'  Yh)
and it is assumed  that  Vy >  0 Vyy S  0.  For  simplicity  of presentation  we
assume  that  initial  producer  prices  are  all  equal  to one.
Consider next the following hypothetical experiment.  For a
revenue  neutral  commodity  tax substitution  a small increment  in the tax
rate levied  on the  i'th  commodity  must  be accompanied  by a small  decrement
in the tax rate on the jth  commodity. The first-order  approximation  to
the  change  in social  welfare  is
(2)  dW  - h-l  [V dPi  +  dP 1]
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where  h is the  derivative  of the  h'th  household's  utility  with respect  to
the  i'th  price. Using  Roy's  identity  we can  write  (2)  as
(3)  dW  *mhl  - A  (xh dP1 +  h dP
where  Ah is the  marginal  utility  of income  of the  h'th  household.
Let us turn now to the revenue constraint  of the government.
Total  commodity  tax  revenue,  R,  can  be expressed  as:
(4)  R  ,  {  tk  Xk
-where  Xk  - Eh 1  Xk  and  tk is the  ad valorem  tax  rate  applied  to the  k'th
commodity. Revenue  neutrality  requires  that
d  [  - *_t+  +  Xk  1]  dP  0
(5)  8h  P+[  t1tka
and  by simple  algebraic  manipulation  we can  write  equation  (5)  as
(6)  dP1 a  XJ  dP x  ij
1 + (1/X )  k-  t  kd
where  a  - 1
1 +  (l/Xi)  4-1  t  Xk
The  parameter  a  determine  the  rate  of  substitution  between  the  changes  in
the  two  prices  and  captures  the  efficiency  dimension  of  the  tax
substitution. It can be interpreted  as the differential  welfare  cost of
raising  public  funds  by taxing  the i'th commodity  more heavily  and using
the  proceeds  to subsidize  the  J'th commodity. To see  this interpretation
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bases,  XL and Xj, are of equal  size.  In this  case, if a  er,ceds  one it
requires  more  than  a dollar  of extra  taxes  from  the  i'th  commodity  in  order
to redutce  the consumer  price of the j'th commodity  by one dollar.  Of
course,  careful  inspection  of the  expression  for  a  reveals  that it  may be
just as easily  less than ona since it measures  tne interaction  of the
commodity  tax substitution  with the initial  tax distortions  tk.  In the
absence  of  pre-existing  commodity  taxes,  the  value  of the  a  parameter  would
simi  Afy to one.3/
If income  were fixed,  implying  that  nontaxable  leisure  consumption
was independent  of the  design  of commodity  taxation,  it is  easy  to see  that
uniform,  across-the-board  indirect  taxes  (a  general  sales  tax  for  example)
would  be superior  on efficiency  grounds. With  no change  in  relative  prices
all of the  derivatives  in the  expression  for  a  would  have a value  of zer,
and thei  value of a  would be simply one.  Of course the optimal tax
literature  allows  for interactions  between  the  consumption  of leisure  and
commodities  or treats leisure  as an untaxed  commodity  and, under these
circumstances,  non-uniform  commodity  taxes  generally  will  have the  highest
efficiency  rating. Here,  our task  is to suppress  the  efficiency  issue  and
seek to discover  instead which  excise tax bases  are preferable on
distribution  grounds.
In  the  special  case  whe!t  All cross-price-elasticities  are  zero,  a
reduces  to  the  simpler  expression
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ax
J Japj  1  + t1  (1  +  tJ)
st~~~~a  t  .7  _  i,  f
1  +  (1/xi)  t
where  v~.  and  'i  are  uncompensated  price  elasticities. Note that  a  - oij;
that  is,  the  value  of a  may be different  for  each  particular  commodity  tax
substitution.  As we show  later,  it i8  important  to know  whether  a  is more
or less  than  unitv. In the  special  case  under  consideration,  since
ax  ax 1
.I  <  0  and  - <  0
a  will  be smaller  than one it ti is  negative  and tj is positive;  that is,
if the reform  reduces  an initial  subsidy  attached  to thn i'th  commodity.
In  this  situation  a lower  level  of both  subsidization  and  taxation  produces
a gain in economic  efficiency. Conversely,  if tj is negative  (an initial
sui.aidy)  and ti is positive,  a  must be greater  than one as the overall
1trel of fiscal  distortion  is increased.  Other alternative  reforms  are
morc difficult  to sign.  Note,  however,  that aij can be estimated  from a
modes.  with  a  representative  consumer which  ignores distributional
considerations.
Substituting  (6) into (3) and rearranging  terms  we obtain  the
principal  result:
(7)  dW  - *  1  h  [  xh  /  X  -a  xh  /  x]  X  dP
If this  expression  is  positive,  then  social  welfare  is  enhanced  by
the tax reform.  Note that, if the households  are ordered  according  to
their  income,  Ah is  a decreasing  function  of income  and  h, the  rank  in the
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income  distribution. Also,  note once again  that dPj is negative  for the
experiment  that  is described.
If  household  h benefits  from  the  reform,  it follows  that
xh /  - ha  xh  / X  0
while  if the  inequality  is raversed  that  household's  welfare  is  diminished.
If households  are  ordered  according  to their  income,  a necessary  condition
for  expression  (7)  to  hold fo-  all  admissible  social  welfare  functions  is
that,  for  the  poorest  household  consuming  x1  and  xi,
1  1
xj /  Xj  - a  Xi  /  Xi  2  0.
Otherwise, a maxi-min social welfare function  that cares only for the
welfare  of the  poorest  hous3hold  would  show  a decline  in  social  welfare.
In  a similar  fashiom.  the  next  poorest  household,  whose
2  2
consumption  pattern  is  denoted  by xi  and  xj.  experiences  an increase  in
welfare  if
x2/  X  a  x2  /  Xi  2  0
However, aggregate welfare could increase even if the second
household  were harmed  by the reform.  With declining  marginal  utility  of
income  the  sum  of both  welfare  changes  is  positive  if
x1 +x2  x1  +  2
Xi  i  a  X  i  2- 0
j  i
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Generalizing from the preceding argument, the requirement  for
welfare dominance can be  stated as follows.  For a revenue neutral
commodity  tax substitution  which shifts  tax  burdens  from the j'th to the
i'th  commodity,  social  welfare  will increase  if  the following  condition  is
satisfied:
(8)  (x/  X  x  X  0  V  k
The expression contained in brackets in equation (8) can be
interpreted  as the  vertical  difference  between  the concentration  curve  of
the jt'th  commodity minus a  times the concentration  curve of the i'th
commodity. A concentration  curve is similar  to the more familiar  Lorenz
curve but  instead of total income it compares the fraction of total
expenditure  on a commodity  that is attributable  to different  income  groups
when they  are arranged,  starting  with the  poorest  group,  according  to the
size  of their  income. If the  value  of  a  is  unity,  welfare  dominance  occurs
whenever  one concentration  cure lies wholly  above  another  throughout  the
entire  range  of the  cumulative  distribution  of income. Alternatively,  the
vertical  difference  between  two  concentratior.  curves,  hereafter  referred  to
as DCC,  must  b- positive  for  welfare  dominance  to  occur.  If,  on the  other
hand,  two  concentration  curves  intersect,  taxation  of one  commodity  cannot
be said  to dominate  the  other. That is,  one  can  always  find  two  plausible
welfare  functions  which  rank the  commodities  in contradicting  orders. For
a thorough  discussion  of the  properties  of concentration  curves  see  Kakwani
(1160),  Pfahler  (1987),  Nygard  and Sandstrom  (1981)  and  Yitzhaki  and  Olkin
(1987).
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The left hand  panel  of Figure  I portrays  a situation  in which  a
revenue  neutral  tax  *ubstitution  from  commodity  A to  commodity  B is  welfare
dominant. The  absence  of welfare  dominance  is indicated  in the  right  hand
panel of Figure I where the two concentration  curves cross.  Welfare
dominance  is also impossible  to achieve  whenever  a exceeds  unity.  To see
this  note that  whenever  a  is unity the  graph for the concentration  curve
starts  at coordinates  (0,0)  and ends up at (1,1).  If a  exceeds  unity,
however,  at least for the richest  household,  the difference  between the
concentration  curve of commodity  A minus  a  times  the concentration  curve
for commodity  B must  be negative. The reason  for this  outcome  is simple.
With an increase  in deadweight  loss,  any welfare function  with constant
marginal  utility  which does not care for redistribution  will indicate  a
deterioration  in social  welfare.
In Panel  C of Figure  I a  is assumed  to ae larger  than  one and,
since  the DCC curve  ends  up at the  coordinates  [1 - a, 1], the  DCC curve
either  crosses  the  horizontal  axis  at least  once  or never  rises  above  it.
Welfare  dominance  is ruled  out  when this  happens.  If,  however,  a  is less
than one, the  DCC will end  up in the  positive  orthant  as shown  in Panel  D
of Figure  I.  In this case an overall  efficiency  gain is indicated  but
welfare dominance still requires that the DCC curve remain above the
horizontal  axis.
In a separate  appendix  we explore  some  additional  features  of the
DCC curve.  Assuming that a  has a value of unity, we show that the
curvature of the DCC curve has an interesting  welfare interpretation.
Specifically,  the  slope  of the  DCC  curve  at a  particular  income  level
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representing  the  poorest  F families  in the  cumulative  distribution  measures
the gain in real income  experienced  by the family  at that income  level.
Similarly,  the size of the  DCC curve itself  indicates  the cumulative  gain
of the  poorest  F families  over  the range  of incomes  when the  DCC  curve  is
increasing.  Losses,  on the other  hand, occur  whenever  the DCC curve is
decreasing  and, over the entire  range  of the DCC curve,  there  is no net
gain  or loss  as long  as a  is one.
Since the value of a  is unknown and difficult to determine
empirically,  we concentrate  in the rest of the  paper on the special  case
where a  is one.  For simplicity  of exposition  belov  we will also assume
that  the  income  distribution  is  a continuous  distribution.
Since  household  surveys  of consumer  expenditure  normally  include
thousands  of obeservations  it would be extremely  cumbersome  to calculate
the DCC for  more than  a few  commodities. Clearly,  some sort  of screening
mechanism would be desirable to distinguish  promising candidates for
welfare dominance.  However, Yitzhaki  (1987) has  provided a  fairly
straightforward  procedure  for reducing  the number  of possibilities  to a
manageable  total.  In an earlier  paper that author  has established  the
following  result:
(8)  J  DCCi  (F) dF  - - (b/51 - bi/Si)  Gy
where  F  is  the  cumulative  distribution of income, Gy is the Gini
coefficient  of income,  Si is  the  share  of the  expenditure  on  Xi and
(9)  bi  - cov (Xi,  F(y))/cov  (y,F  (y))
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is Siever's  (1983)  non-parametric  estimator  of the  slope  of the regression
line  of  Xi on  Y.  In  our  context  bi can  be interpreted  in  two  ways.  On one
hand bi is equal to the area  between the 450  line and the concentration
curve  if  the  ith  coi.modity  divided  by the  area  between  the  450  line  and  the
Lorenz curve (see Yitzhaki and Olkin, 1987).  Alternatively,  bi is a
weighted mean of the marginal  propensity  to spend on commodity  i.  As
argued  in  Yitzhaki  (1987),  bi/Si  can  be interpreted  as the  weighted  average
income  elasticity  of commodity  i.  Hence  equation  (9)  indicates  that the
sign of the area below che DCCji curve is determined  by the difference
between the weighted average income elasticities  of the commodities.
Since,  if  commodity  i  is to dominate  commodity  J, DCCii  must be positive,
it is  clear  that  a  necessary  (but,  of  course,  not sufficient)  condition  for
welfare  dominance  is that  the  weighted  income  elasticity  of commodity  j  be
lower  than  that  for  commodity  i.
The  isame  argument  can  be  repeated  using  the  extended  Gini.  The
extended  Gini is a weighted  integral  of the area between  the forty-five
degree  line  and the  Lorenz  curve  (see  Yitzhaki  1983). The  formula  for  the
extended  Gini  is:
(10)  Gy (v)  - - v  cov (y,  [l-F(y)]V-l)  /  y  ;  v >  1.
Here v is an inequality-aversion  parameter  chosen  by the investigator  and
py  is  the  mean  value  of  the  distribution.  The  extended  Gini  is  similar  to
the  Gini  coefficient  except  that  it  uses  a  different  weighting  scheme.  The
standard  Gini is  a  special  case  of  the  extended  Gini  where  v  is  2.  The
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higher  is  v, the  greater  is  the  importance  attached  to the  bottom  of  the
income  distribution.  /
The preceding  analysis  based  on the  Gini  can  be replicated  in
terms  of  the  extended  Gini.
(11)  (v-l)  f  [DCCji  (F)  (l.F)v- 2 df -
- [bj  (v)  / Sj - bi (v)  / Si))  Gy (v)
wherg
- cov (Xi,  [1  - F(y)]  1)
(12)  bi  i(v)  -Cv(.1  ()v1
coy  (y,  [1  - F(y)]  -)
is the  estimator  of the (extended)  Gini  marginal  propensity  to spend  on
commodity  i. The  difference  in  the  bi  (v)  is  attributable  to  the  choice  of
weighting  schemes.  Each  weighting  scheme  is  increasing  with  income  up  to  a
certain  quantile  and  then  it  declines.  Table  1  presents  the  quantile  with
the  highest  weight  for  various  values  of  v.
Equation  (11)  provides  additional  necessary  conditions  for  welfare
dominance. If commodity  i dominates  commidity  J, a shift  from  taxing
commodity  j  to  commodity  i would  decrease  the  extended  Gini  inequality
index  for  all  v, including  the  standard  Gini  case  where  v - 2.  These
necessary  conditions  are useful  in empirical  investigation  of welfare
dominance  because  they  are  fairly  easy  to calculate  and  can  be used  to
identify  the  pair  of  commodities  for  which  welfare  dominance  is  possible.
Not  surprisingly,  the  notion  of  welfare  dominance  is  linked  to  the
conventional  wisdom  of imposing  luxury  excises  on items  of consumption
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having  a  relatively  high  income  elasticity  of  demand.  However,  important
differences  between  the  two  approaches  still  exist.  Conventional
measurements  of  income  elasticity  use  the  mean  of  the  income  distribution
as  a  reference  point  and  are  indifferent  to  income  inequality.  The  partial
test  for  welfare  dominance,  on  the  other  hand,  measures  the  income
elasticity  at  each  point  along  the  concentration  curve  and  is sensitive  to
the  income  position  of  the  spender.6/  Moreover,  the  usual  argument  for
luxury  excises  cannot  easily  distinguish  on  welfare  grounds  which  of  two
income-elastic  commodities  would  be  the  most  suitable  target  for  excise
taxation.
In  the  analysis  of  the  expenditure  data  for  the  C6te  d'Ivoire
that  follows,  weighted  income  elasticities  are  compared  for  different  pairs
of  commodities.  The  weights  employed  are  those  associated  with  the
calculation  of  the  extended  Gini  coefficient.  Values  for  these  weights  are
permitted  to  vary  between  1.5  and  5  and  some  of  the  welfare  implications  of
this  range  of  values  are  depicted  in  Table  1.  Higher  values  for  these
weights  attach  more  importance  to  the  lower  end  of  the  income  distribution.
A  weight  of  unity  implies  complete  indifference  to  inequality  while  an
infinitely  large  value  would  assign  zero  weights  to  everyone  except  the
household  with  the  lowest  income.  Thus  a  range  of  values  between  1.5  and  5
encompasses  a  reasonable  diversity  of  views  about  the  importance  of  income
inequality.
C.  Welfare  Dominance  and  ET taxes  in  the  C6te  dl'voire
Data  for  the  C6te  d'Ivoire  originate  from  a  random  sample  of
1,600  households  who were  surveyed  over  a  period  of  a  year  starting  in
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Table  1:  'WELFARE  WEIGHTS  (v)  AND  THE DISTRIBUTIVE
PERCENTILE  (Pi)  WITH THE LARGEST  WEIGHT
V  1.5  2  3  6
Pi  .56  .5  .42  .3
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1985.  The design  of that  *urvey  and  its implementation  is thoroughly
described  in  Ains%orth  and  Munoz  (1986).  The  survey  attempted  to  collect
information  on  household  income  sources,  consumption  patterns,  employment
activities,  housing  conditions  and several  other subjects.  On the
expenditure  side  data  were  collected  on regularly  purchased  nonfood  items
(fuel,  cigarettes  for example),  on irregularly  purchased  clothing,
household goods and maintenance,  food expenditures,  durable  goods
ownership,  housing  rents  and  the  value  of  home  produced  and  consumed  food.
In Table 2 one can see the expenditure  shares  of different
consumption  categories  and the  range  of  values  for  the  weighted  income
elasticities.  Most  food  items  and,  as  well,  tobacco  products,  are  income-
inelastic  but  as  the  welfare  weights  attach  more  importance  to  low-income
consumption  the  income  elasticity  approaches  unity  for  rice,  millet,  bread,
casava  and  a casava  derivative  called  attieke. Income  elasticities  for
public  transportation,  education  expenses  and  alcoholic  beverages  hover
slightly  above  unity.  Consumption  of gasoline,  telephone-telegraph  and
electricity, on the other hand, all exhibit income elasticities
substantially  larger  than  one.
On the  basis  of the  income  elasticity  information  contained  in
Table  2  numerous  pairwise  tax  comparisons  can  be  made  to  identify  instances
of  welfare  dominance.  It  would  appear,  for  example,  that,  as  alternative
commodity  tax bases,  telephones  dominate  electricity  and gasoline,
electricity  dominates  public transportation  and gasoline  dominates
alcoholic  beverages.  Figures  2-5,  which  exhibit  the  form  of  the  empirical
DCC  curve  for  each  comparison,  confirm  these  suspicions.
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Tale.2:  INCOME  ELASTICITIES  OF CONSUMPTION  FOR  C6TE  D'IVOIRE  A/
Expenditure  Weighted  income  elasticity:  v -
Consumption  category  share
1.5  2  3  4  5
Total  expenditure  (Gini)  1  .32  .45  .57  .64  .67
Casava  .036  .46  .54  .64  .7  .74
Rice  .04  .78  .87  .95  .98  .99
Maize  .05  .42  .58  .69  .75  .77
Millet  .001  .88  1.0  1.1  1.12  1.12
Bread  .016  .82  .88  .95  .98  1.0
Attieke  .018  .93  .99  1.05  1.07  1.09
Sugar  .007  .59  .68  .77  .82  .85
Cigarettes,  tobacco,
cola  nuts  .011  .63  .65  .68  .70  .72
Gasoline  .04  1.71  1.58  1.41  1.33  1.29
Public  transportation  .03  1.13  1.12  1.11  1.10  1.10
Telegraph-telephone  .003  2.25  1.96  1.67  1.54  1.47
Alcoholic  beverages  .017  1.17  1.14  1.11  1.10  1.09
Electricity  .02  1.64  1.52  1.41  1.36  1.32
Education  expenses  .042  1.24  1.20  1.16  1.14  1.13
Rent  and  dividends  .05  1.61  1.54  1.45  1.39  1.35
Wages  .30  1.54  1.52  1.42  1.37  1.34
s' Income  is defined  as total  expenditure  plus  consumption  of  home
produced  goods  per capita.
Source: C6te  d'Ivoire  Living  Standards  Survey,  World  Bank,  1986.
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Rather  than  present  a large,  and  potentially  confusing,  array  of
DCC curves for the C6te d'Ivoire, Table 3 summarises  our efforts to
establish a welfare ordering of alternative  commodity taxes using the
criterion  of marginal  welfare  dominance. Of the  five  promising  excise  tax
candidates consisting of telephones,  electricity,  gasoline, alcoholic
beverages and public transportation,  we concluded  that the taxation  of
telephone  services  dominates  all  of the  other  items  in this  group. Taxing
electricity  consumption,  on the other  hand, dominates  the taxation  of
alcoho'lic  beverages  and public  transportation  but does  not  quite  manage  to
dominate  the taxation  of gasoline. Gasoline  taxation,  by the  same token,
dominates  a tax on either  alcoholic  beverages  or public transportation.
Finally,  a tax on alcoholic  beverages  fails  to dominate  a tax on public
transportation. It would  be possible  to extend  this welfare  ordering  to
include  other  items  shown  in  Table 2  but tbs  ranking  shown  in Table  3 are
perhaps  the  most interesting  ones for  policy  purposes  and it is clear  from
Table 2 that taxes  on food and cigarettes  would  be dominated  by taxes  on
any  of the  five  candidates  already  examined.
An  interesting extension of the analysis is to consider the
welfare implications  of adjusting  the  mix of direct  and indirect  taxes  in
the C6te d'Ivoire. This welfare  comparison  can be achieved  by viewing  a
tax  on  wages  or rents  and  dividends  as a tax  on all  of the  expenditure  made
by workers  or capitalists  respectively. From  Table  2  it appears  that the
weighted  income  elasticities  for capital  and labor  incomes  are relatively
large and  extremely close to one  another in size.  Moreover, while
telephone  consumption  dominates  either  income  component  as a tax  base, it
is  also  apparent  that  neither  electricity  nor  gasoline  consumption  does  the
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Table:  THE WELFARE  ORDERING  OF COMMODITY  TAXES
IN  THE COTE D'IVOIRE
Commodity/Tax  Base
1. Telephone  dominates  A/  dominates  &/  dominates dominates
2. Electricity  does  not  dominates dominatej
dominate
3. Gasoline  dominates dominates




A/  A close  examination  of the  individual  observations  for  bread  and  water
reveals that the curve intersects  the X-axis for the very last
observation.  If  this  sample  exactly  portrayed  the  population,  a social
welfare  function  that  is  linear  over  the  whole  range  of  the  distribution
and  concave  between  the  second  richest  family  and  the  richest  one  would
show  that  subsidizing  bread  at the  expense  of water  would  be welfare
decreasing.  However,  we suspect  that  this  is  a  result  of  the  sampling
error. Where  we take  the  average  of  two  consecutive  observations  this
anomaly  disappears.






I  ~ I  I  ,  I  .*O
4~~~"  o  °  0 
Maml**l4/VeUzr  Domnec  & thb  Deal  of  holes  ?at.ole  Xu lb  Coto D'ZvoLITizurk:ebISIlSISFigure  3









S*  ~0.1 
0.09
(9
o  02460.08  8
0.07-
0.06 
ft *  ~0.05-
0.04-





















z  d~~~~~~~~~~~V 
0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
iJjCs  O
I  I  I  I  1  1'  * 
'0  0  Cs  Cs0 *  D  O  N  O0  e  O  E  O  0e
H.114/Vlfhae  Demlae  a the Desig  f  ose  TStlO  istOCt  D'ZwizolUis:bSI1SIU- 27 -
same.  On balance, income taxes and ET taxes have surprisingly  similar
consequences  for  income  distribution.
Currently,  the C6te d'Ivoire  functions  with a value-added  tax on
manufacturing  activity  and a cascaded  tax  on  most services  provided  in  urban
areas.  Both taxes  are  described  in  Heian  and  Monson  (1987). There  are  also
traditional  excise tax levies  on tobacco  products,  alcoholic  beverages  and
fuel.  Our results  suggest  that  it would  be worthwhile  to extend  the  excise
tax  network  to include  electricity  and  telephones.
D.  Summing  Mg
This paper  has had two  major goals.  Introducing  a relatively  new
technique  for evaluating  alternative  excise  tax  bases  has been one of them.
Examining  differences  in the concentration  curves  between  various  pairs  of
commodities  can be used as a tool for identifying  desirable  excise tax
options.  Concentration  curves  have been used previously  to illuminate  the
distributive  impact  of alternative  direct  tax  measures.  In this paper  the
concept  has been adapted  to study the structure  of indirect  taxes and to
explore  the  welfare  consequences  of  a variety  of indirect  tax  reforms.
In particular, concentration curves have been used  to obtain
conditions  under  which  a  wide  range  of social  welfare  functions  would  approve
of a particular  commodity  tax substitution. Where imposing  a tax on one
commodity  and using the proceeds  to reduce taxes on another  receives  the
approval of nearly all plausible social welfare functions, the first
commoditv  is said to dominate  the other.  More precisely,  the requirements
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for marginal conditional  welfare dominance are satisfied.  Part of the
attraction  of the concept  of welfare  dominance  is that it allows  at least
some excise tax policies to rest on weak and reasonably  nonrestrictive
normative  considerations. Using household  budget data at least a partial
welfare  ordering  of alternative  excise  taxes  can  be achieved. Besides  being
virtually  value-free,  the  approach  of searching  for  welfare  dominance  is to  a
large extent model free in that in its simpliest form no knowledge of
consumer  price  behavior  is required. More sophisticated  application  of the
methodology  would,  however,  have to consider  the efficiency  as well as the
equity  implications  of changes  in excise  taxes  and to take into  account  the
reactions  of consumers  to tax  reforms.
The welfare  framework  utilized  in this  paper is closely  related  to
that found in the literature  on optimum  taxation. Ahmad  and Stern (1984),
for example,  measure  the  marginal  social  cost of raising  extra  indirect  tax
revenue  from different  sources  using explicit  welfare  weights  and empirical
estimates  of consumer  price elasticities. However,  their  objective  is to
describe  the optimum  commodity  structure  that  would emerge  from equalizing
the marginal social  cost of revenue  from different  sources.  Our task of
identifying  welfare-improving  tax reforms is less ambitious  and requires
significantly  le!is  information  about  the  economy.
The other goal of this paper has been to apply the dominance
approach  to the C6te d'Ivoire  and to extract  some policy  conclusions  about
the  design  of excise  taxation  in that  country. What  emerged  from  that  effort
was the  clear  dominance  of telephones  as a tax  base  and  the  near  dominance  of
electricity  consumption..  Further  reflection  on ET (electricity-telephone)
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taxation  suggests  that it  may be a relatively  under-exploited  tax  base in a
number  of  developing  countries.
Greater  reliance  on the ET tax  base has much to recommend  it.  In
addition  to their appeal on income  distribution  grounds,  ET taxes  may be
relatively  efficient  revenue  sources  if they  can  be implemented  through  two-
part  pricing  schemes. Moreover,  they  are  relatively  easy  to  administer,  they
lend themselves  readily  to the destination  principle  of commodity  taxation
and they can distinguish  between  business  and household  use without great
difficulty.
Despite these advantages,  the basic argument  favoring  higher ET
taxes in the C6te d'Ivoire, and perhaps elsewhere,  relies  on acceptable
income  distribution  effects.  In an earlier  paper,  McLure  and Thirsk  (1978)
proposed  the removal  of excise  taxes  on beer and cigarettes  for essentially
the same reasons,  that they  were income  and price inelastic  in consumption
and therefore  had a harmful  impact  on welfare.  Here,  we make the opposite
claim,  that the  imposition  of ET taxes  would  enhance  economic  welfare. Many
countries  appear to act perversely  by taxing  beer consumption  heavily and
subsidizing  the  consumption  of electricity. Another  way of looking  at this
eqjuity  claim  is to note  that in  most developing  countries  the  consumption  of
a wide range of consumer  durables  such as TVs, VCRs and fridges  is income
elastic. However,  in most cases  it is difficult  to tax  either  the services
provided  by these  durables  or their  initial  purchase. It  may  be much  easier
instead to  tax  a  close complement, electricity consumption, in this
situation.
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Our  enthusiasm  for  ET  taxes  may  have  to be  tempered  by  a
consideration  of external  effects  in consumption. At least  in the case of
telephones consumers'  enjoyment from phoning  may depend on who else has
access  to a  phone. Up to a  point,  the  utility  of owning  a telephone  may  be a
function  of the  number  of subscribers,  in  which  case an efficiency  argument
can be made for subsidizing  rather  than taxing  telephone  use.  Once more,
efficiency  and equity  concerns  clash in the design  of an appropriate  tax
policy.
Future  work in this area can  profitably  proceed  in several  areas.
First,  it would  be useful  to disaggregate  large  expenditure  aggregates  such
as public  transportation,  alcoholic  be-erages  and telephones  in order  to see
if some components  have different  distributive  characteristics  and are not
close  substitutes  in consumption. For  example,  differential  excise  taxes  on
beer  versus  fine  wine,  or long  distance  versus  local  phone  calls,  may  be used
to fine-tune the system of excise taxes.  Secondly, more work on the
efficiency  dimensions  of excise taxation  would be desirable.  Finally,  a
useful extension to the analysis  would incorporate  the horizontal  equity
aspects  of excise  taxation.
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ENDNOTES
1.  This unhappy situation,  and the recommendation  to shift more towards
consumption  taxation,  is discussed  in an African  context  by Z. Shalizi
and L. Squire, "Tax Policy  for Sub-Saharan  Africa",  World Bank, June
2986.
2.  More  generally, the  change in a  Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function,  W - W (U1 .. UH) can be written as
dW  - M18W/8Ui  . aUi/ayi  . yi  where  aW/aU 1 is the  ethical  weight  attached
to the  i'th  household's  change  in  utility  and  the  product
aw/au 1 . aui/ly,  can  be interpreted  as the  marginal  social  utility  of
income.  In the utilitarian framework the ethical weights are all
normalized around unity  and  the marginal social utility of income
declines  with  higher  incomes.
3.  It is  worth  emphasizing  that  the  value  of  a  is  unique  to each  particular
commodity tax  substitution and that it is the single part of our
methodology  that  compels  resort  to some  kind of  modelling  exercise. The
purpose of our analysis is to see what welfare implications  can be
extracted from the limited household survey information  on consumer
behavior  that is typically  available  in developing  countries.  If more
information  on consumer  behavior  were available  it  woulC  also  be possible
to incorporate  secord-order  excess  burden  effects  into  the  analysis.
HaMc1ll4/Welfar,  Dominance  & the  Design  of  Excise  Taxation  in  tho  Cote  D'Ivoire/WThirsk:ab/5/18/88- 32  -
4.  Nonetheless,  the welfare rankings  are transitive  so that if a tax on
commodity  B dominates  one on commodity  C, a tax on commodity  A  also
dominates  one levied  on C.
5.  See Yitzhaki  (1983)  for a complete  discussion  of the properties  of the
extended  Gini.
6.  Formally  we can  write
bi  (v)  - f  w (F  (y),  v) xi (y)  dy
where  w (F (y),  v) is the  weight  attached  to the  marginal  propensity  of
spending  on the  ith  commodity,  xi(y). In the  case  of the  Gini  v - 2
then
v  (F  (),  2)  F (y) [1  - F(y)]
--  (F tY),  2)  -J F (z)  [1 - F (z)  dz
which  means  that  the  highest  weight  is  given  to the  marginal  propensity
of the  median  individual.  The  higher  v, the  higher  the  weight  attached
to low  income  groups. See  Yitzhaki  (1987).
7.  The results for the C6te dl'voire  also indicate  the desirability  of
taxing gasoline.  We have resisted the temptation to recommend ETG
(electricity-telephone-gasoline)  excises  because  gasoline  taxes in most
countries  serve  as  crude  user  fees  for  the  consumption  of  road  services
and therefore  have an efficiency  rationale  that is quite  different  from
the  equity  considerations  which  distinguish  ET taxes.
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APPENDIX
Additional  Properties  of the  DCC  curves
1I the  main part of the  paper  we have used the concentration  curve
(hereafter  CC) and the difference  in concentration  curve (hereafter  DCC) in
order to see  whether  one can order  tax  bases according  to the  criterion  of
marginal  conditional  welfare  dominance. In this  appendix  we intend  to  derive
several  properties  of those  curves  that  will  provide  further  intuition  behind
the  ordering. Our task  is to show  that  there  is an interesting  relationship
between  the concavity  (convexity  of these  curves)  and  the income  elasticity
of the tax bases.  For simplicity  of presentation  continuous  functions  are
used  here.
Let  Cj (Y)  be the  Engel  curve  for  commodity  J.
CJ  (Y)  - E(CJ  I  Y).
The expectation  operator  reflects  the fact that families  with income  Y may
consume  different  quantities  of commodity  j.
The concentration  curve  of commodity  J with respect  to income  Y is
defined  implicitly  by:
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(13)  (F)  - (1/Aj)  fq  Cj (y)  f (y)  dy
where
(14)  F(q) - fq  f  (y) dy
f (y) and F (y)  are, respectively,  the  density  function  and the cumulative
distribution  of income  and  pi  is the  mean expenditure  on commodity  j  in the
population.  The  DCCij curve  is the vertical difference between the
concentration  curves  of  commodity  i and  commodity  J.
Formally,
(15)  DCCij(F) - i (F) - J  (F)  -
q
- (l/Hi)  JfO  Ci (y)  f  (y)  dy
- (l/P  )  JO  Cj  (y)  f (y) dy
The  curve  describes  the  difference  in the  shares  of expenditures  on commodity
i and J, that is spent  by the  poorest  F families. The DCC curve  begins  at
coordinates  (0,0)  and  ends  up at (0,1)  since  the  difference  in shares  is  zero
in the  bottom  and  the  top  of the  income  distribution.
The derivative  of  DCC  curve  with respect  to F is  equal  to:
(16)  aDCCij  (F)  /  aF - Ci (q)  /pi  - CJ (q) 
- [ClJ  (q)  p ls  [Ci  (q)  /C,]  (q)  - i  UJt
Thus the cur-re  is increasing  if the ratio of expenditure  on commodity  i
relative  to commodity  J  is higher  than the overall  ratio of the shares  in
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expenditure  in the  population.  Given  our  assumption  of a  unitary  value  for  a
the ratio of the overall  shares is the slope  of the public sector  budget
constraint. Formally,
(17)  [  - dPj/dPi]  - pi/pj,
That is the second  term in equation  (16)  is the  change  in prices  that  will
keeF the ravenua-  constant.  Let us consider  the reqt:ired  change  in income
that  will enable the individual  with income  q to continue  to purchase  the
same  bundle  as  before:
(18)  A (q)  - dP 1Cj (q)  + dPi  Ci (q)  -
ci (q)
- ci (q)  dPi [  dP 1 /dPi  +  C  (q)
Using (17)  and the fact  that  we are  dealing  with a dollar  increase  in taxes
(that  is dPj - 1/sj)  we get  equation  (16).  Therefore  the  slope  of the DCC
curve measures  the gain in dollars  to families  with income  q and the J)CC
curve itself indicates  the cumulative  gain (in dollars)  of the poorest F
individuals. Thus  whenever  the  DCC  is increasing  (decreasing)  it  means  that
the income group which is represented  on the horizontal  axis is gaining
(losing)  from the change  in taxes.  This also explains  why the DCC curves
start  at zero and end up at zero.  Because  the  budget  of the government  is
constant  and  no efficiency  gain  or loss  is taken  into  account,  the  total  gain
in dollars  for  the  society  is  zero.
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The  second  derivative  of the  DCC  curve  is  equal  to:
(1/  f(q))  ici /  Pi - c'J/PJ]
That is the second  derivative  is positive  or negative  depending  on whether
the  ratio  of  the  average propensities  to  spend  in the population.
Alternatively,  by dividing  and  multiplying  each  term  by the  ratio  c (q)/q  we
write  the  second  derivative  of the  DCC  as:
1_  Wi~ (q)  ci  (q)
q  (qi  [  Ai'  p
where  .i is the income  elasticity  of of the  i'th  commodity  and  C(q)/q  is the
ratio  of  household  consumption  to  mean  consumption.
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